

LTE Network Security – Private Networks

Simon Lardner Challenge Networks / Vocus



Introduction to Challenge Networks

- One of the leaders in private LTE network design & build in Australia
- Have 20+ deployed LTE networks both in Australia and internationally
- Recently acquired by Vocus
- A number of 'first's in private LTE networks:
 - First underground LTE network in mining
 - First in Oil & Gas
 - First Gold mine
 - First in Peru
 - First in Copper mine
 - First using Nokia technology
 - First to use Band1 (2100 MHz) in Australia for LTE







Why talk about it ?

- Security is becoming more topical -> Some people are getting paid lots!
- Some (in)famous examples recently
- In the area of private networks becoming a 'hot topic' as the industry becomes more mature
- More edge devices being connected -> More to go wrong
- Smarter edge devices -> More to go wrong
- Different types of edge devices -> More to go wrong

"DDos by Fridge"




What are we talking about (and not) today ?

- A huge topic just touching on a few items !!
- Focus on private industrial networks so NOT consumer networks or public safety networks (but there is some overlap)
- Just talk about 4G (but 5G is similar)
- What are key areas to <u>not worry</u> about
- What are key areas to worry about
- Four specific solutions 'easy wins'



What are you trying to protect from ?

- Stupidity
- Ignorance
- Maliciousness
- Mistakes



History of 'Codebreaking' – Brisbane 'Central Bureau'



21 Henry St, Ascot

CENTRAL BUREAU, AN ORGANISATION COMPRISING SERVICE PERSONNEL OF AUSTRALIA, U.S.A., BRITAIN, CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND, BOTH MEN AND WOMEN, FUNCTIONED IN THIS HOUSE FROM 1942 TILL 1945. FROM INTERCEPTED ENEMY RADIO MESSAGES THE ORGANISATION PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE WHICH MADE A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIED VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC WAR.






Opening statements

- By design, with regards to security, LTE is 'pretty good'
- It's better than Wi-Fi so don't confuse them
- LTE/4G (and now 5G) is a continually evolving protocol







Device (UE) Authentication

- User authentication
 - Device
 - SIM card
- Data confidentiality
- Data integrity protection
- User identity confidentiality
- Mutual Authentication






Device / UE



Air Interface - Uu




- Encryption of Control plane & User plane
- No collision domains or limitations in Broadcast Domains
- The above has lots of positive implications





eNodeB to Core interface – S1



- The 'backhaul' or transmission network
- NOT by default encrypted
- May (or may not) be a problem – depends on network


A key problems / 'Opportunities' with private ARCIA

- Different users with different security profiles:
 - 'IT users'
 - 'OT users'
- Different user requirements:
 - QoS
 - Access control
- User devices have different 'abilities'
- Users sometimes 'play' with stuff
- Very specialised traffic flows




Some solution options to consider

- Core network configuration Network slicing
- EIR Equipment Identity Register
- Monitoring end to end network
- MDN Mobile Device Manager






Security 'zones' of a private LTE network – * networks within a network



End to End – Quality of Service (QoS)










Components of the network (a bit technical)





EIR – Equipment identity Register

- Standard LTE function/system
- Used completely differently to consumer networks
- 'Locks' a SIM card (IMSI) to a specific Device (IMEI) or device type
- Requires some maturity from the end user and/or network owner
- Critical to implement if you multiple security domains in network









UE – MDM (mobile device Manager)


- Essentially 'controls' the phone.
- Really important if you have critical applications on device.





Network monitoring

- Only one thing worse than having a problem...
- Not knowing you have a problem.
- Needs to be at 'whole of network' & 'UE level'



Whole of Network

UE 'Heat map'

Questions ?



